We examine the robustness and privacy properties of Bayesian inference, under assumptions on the prior. With no modifications to the Bayesian framework, we show that a simple posterior sampling algorithm results in uniform utility and privacy guarantees. In more detail, we generalise the concept of differential privacy to arbitrary dataset distances, outcome spaces and distribution families. We then prove bounds on the robustness of the posterior, introduce a posterior sampling mechanism, show that it is differentially private and provide finite sample bounds for distinguishability-based privacy under a strong adversarial model. Finally, we give examples satisfying our assumptions.
Introduction
Our work builds a unified understanding of privacy and learning in adversarial environments, under a decision-theoretic framework. We show that under suitable assumptions, standard Bayesian inference and posterior sampling can achieve uniformly good utility with a fixed privacy budget in the differential privacy setting.
Summary of setting. A Bayesian statistician (B) wants to communicate results about data x to a third party (A ), but without revealing the data x itself. We make no assumptions on the the data x, which could be a single observation, an i.i.d. sample, a sequence of observations. 1. B selects a model family (F Θ ) and a prior (ξ).
2.
A is allowed to see F Θ and ξ and is computationally unbounded.
3. B observes data x and calculates the posterior ξ(θ|x) but does not reveal it. Then, for steps t = 1, . . .
4.
A sends a query q t to B.
5. B responds r t in a mannner that depends on the posterior. * A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [Dimitrakakis et al., 2014 ] Algorithmic Learning Theory 2014.
We show that if F Θ or ξ are chosen appropriately, a posterior sampling mechanism can be used to respond to queries. This mechanism satisfies generalised differential privacy, indistinguishability and utility properties. In addition, the posterior exhibits robustness.
The posterior sampling mechanism draws a setΘ of i.i.d. samples from the posterior distribution. Then all the responses only depend on the posterior throughΘ. Since our algorithm only takes a single sample setΘ, further queries by the adversary reveal nothing more about the data than can be inferred from Θ. Consequently, we can respond to an arbitrary number of queries with a bounded privacy budget, while guaranteeing good utility for all responses.
The intuition behind our results is that robustness and privacy are linked via smoothness. Learning algorithms that are smooth mappings-their output (e.g., a spam filter) varies little with perturbations to input (e.g., similar training corpora)-are robust: outliers have reduced influence, and adversaries cannot easily discover unknown information about the data. This suggests that robustness and privacy can be simultaneously achieved and are in fact deeply linked. More precisely, our contributions are:
• We generalise differential privacy to arbitrary dataset distances, outcome spaces, and distribution families.
• Under certain regularity conditions on the prior distribution ξ or likelihood family F Θ , we show that the posterior distribution is robust : small changes in the dataset result in small posterior changes.
• We introduce a novel posterior sampling mechanism that is private.
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• Unlike other common mechanisms in differential privacy, our approach sits squarely in the non-private (Bayesian) learning framework without modification.
• We introduce the notion of dataset distinguishability for which we provide finite-sample bounds for our mechanism.
• We provide examples of conjugate-pair distributions where our assumptions hold.
Paper organisation. Section 1.1 discusses related work. Section 2 specifies the setting and our assumptions. Section 3 proves results on robustness of Bayesian learning. Section 4 proves our main privacy results. In particular, Section 4.1 shows that the posterior distribution is differentially private, Section 4.2 describes our posterior sampling query response algorithm, Section 4.3 derives bounds on dataset indistinguishability, Section 4.5 shows how to obtain matching lower bounds for distinguishability, while Section 4.4 shows how utility and privacy can be traded off within our framework. Examples where our assumptions hold are given in Section 5. We present a discussion of our results and links to the exponential mechanism and robust Bayesian inference in Section 6. Appendix A contains proofs of the main theorems. Finally, Appendix B gives proofs of the examples demonstrating our assumptions.
Background and Related Work
The study of learning, security, robustness and privacy, and their relationships is an imporant area of statistics. Interest in adversarial learning is accelerating [Joseph et al., 2013] while differential privacy has brought data privacy onto firm theoretical footing [Duchi et al., 2013 , McSherry and Talwar, 2007 . In practice, security and privacy are in tension with learning and are of growing economic and societal concern.
In Bayesian statistical decision theory [Berger, 1985 , Bickel and Doksum, 2001 , DeGroot, 1970 , learning is cast as a statistical inference problem and decision-theoretic criteria are used as a basis for assessing, selecting and designing procedures. In particular, for a given cost function, the Bayes-optimal procedure minimises the Bayes risk under a particular prior distribution.
In an adversarial setting, this is extended to a minimax risk, by assuming that the prior distribution is selected arbitrarily by nature. In the field of robust statistics, the minimax asymptotic bias of a procedure incurred within an ǫ-contamination neighbourhood is used as a robustness criterion giving rise to the notions of a procedure's influence function and breakdown point to characterise robustness [Hampel et al., 1986 , Huber, 1981 . In a Bayesian context, robustness appears in several guises including minimax risk, robustness of the posterior within ǫ-contamination neighbourhoods, and robust priors [Berger, 1985] . In this context Grünwald and Dawid [2004] demonstrated the link between robustness in terms of the minimax expected score of the likelihood function and the (generalised) maximum entropy principle, whereby nature is allowed to select a worst-case prior.
Differential privacy, first proposed by , has achieved prominence in the theory of computer science, databases, and more recently learning communities. Its success is largely due to the semantic guarantee of privacy it formalises. Differential privacy is normally defined with respect to a randomised mechanism for responding to queries. Informally, a mechanism preserves differential privacy if perturbing one training instance results in a small change to the mechanism's response distribution; a formal definition is deferred to Section 2.
A popular approach for achieving differential privacy is the exponential mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] which generalises the Laplace mechanism of adding Laplace noise to released statistics . The exponential mechanism releases a response with probability exponential in a score function measuring distance to the non-private response. An alternate approach, employed for privatising regularised empirical-risk minimisation [Chaudhuri et al., 2011] , is to alter the inferential procedure itself, in that case by adding a random term to the primal objective. We view our posterior sampling mechanism as a Bayesian counterpart. Further results on the accuracy of the exponential mechanism with respect to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance are given in [Wasserman and Zhou, 2010] , which introduced the concept of privacy as a hypothesis testing where an adversary tries to distinguish two datasets. Unlike previous studies, our mechanisms do not require modification to the underlying learning framework: a Bayesian statistician using our mechanism need only choose an appropriately concentrated prior.
In a different direction, Duchi et al. [2013] provided information-theoretic bounds for private learning, by modelling the protocol for interacting with an adversary as an arbitrary conditional distribution, rather than restricting it to specific mechanisms. In a similar vein Chaudhuri and Hsu [2012] drew a quantitative connection between robust statistics and differential privacy by providing finite sample convergence rates for differentially private plug-in statistical estimators in terms of the gross error sensitivity, a common measure of robustness. These bounds can be seen as complementary to ours because our Bayesian estimators do not have private views of the data but use a suitably-defined prior instead.
Little research in differential privacy focuses on the Bayesian paradigm, and to our knowledge, none has established differentially-private Bayesian inference. Williams and McSherry [2010] applied Bayesian inference to improve the utility of differentially private releases by computing posteriors in a noisy measurement model. In a similar vein, Xiao and Xiong [2012] used Bayesian credible intervals to respond to queries with as high utility as possible, subject to a privacy budget. In the PAC-Bayesian setting, Mir [2012] showed that the Gibbs estimator [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] is differentially private. While their algorithm corresponds to a posterior sampling mechanism, it is a posterior found by minimising risk bounds; by contrast, our results are purely Bayesian and come from conditions on the prior. Finally, independently to our preliminary work [Dimitrakakis et al., 2014] , Wang et al. [2015] later proved differential privacy results for Gaussian processes under similar assumptions.
Smoothness of the learning map, achieved here for Bayesian inference by appropriate concentration of the prior, is related to algorithmic stability which is used in statistical learning theory to establish error rates [Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002] . Rubinstein et al. [2012] used γ-uniform stability to calibrate the level of noise when using the Laplace mechanism to achieve differential privacy for the SVM. Hall et al. [2013] extended this technique to adding Gaussian process noise for differentially private release of infinite-dimensional functions lying in an RKHS.
It is important to also note that Dwork and Lei [2009] made the first connection between (frequentist) robust statistics and differential privacy, developing mechanisms for the interquartile, median and B-robust regression. While robust statistics are designed to operate near an ideal distribution, they can have prohibitively high global, worst-case sensitivity. In this case privacy was still achieved by performing a differentially-private test on local sensitivity before release [Dwork and Smith, 2009] . Little further work has explored robustness and privacy, and no general connection is known.
Previous versions and follow up work. Finally, we should note that preliminary versions of this work appeared on arXiv [Dimitrakakis et al., 2013 . Latest version 2015 and ALT [Dimitrakakis et al., 2014] . This version corrects technical issues with one proof, which affected the leading constants. We also replaced the original mechanism with one taking a fixed sample, which allow us to maintain a fixed privacy budget for an arbitrary number of queries. We make a novel use of Le Cam's method to prove lower bounds on indistinguishability. And we complement our original bounds with bounds for the utility of the mechanism. Finally, we discuss the relationship between posterior sampling, the exponential mechanism and the safe Bayesian generalisation of Bayesian inference. Follow-up work includes Wang et al. [2015] who, under similar assumptions proved differential privacy results for Gibbs samplers and Zheng [2015] who improved some of our original bounds and also presented new results for other members of the exponential family.
Problem Setting
We consider the problem of a Bayesian statistician (B) communicating with an untrusted third party (A ). B wants to convey useful information to the queries of A (e.g., how many people suffer from a disease or vote for a particular party) without revealing private information about the original data (e.g., whether a particular person has cancer). This requires communicating information in a way that strikes a good balance between utility and privacy. In this paper, we study the inherent privacy and robustness properties of Bayesian inference and explore the question of whether B can select a prior distribution so that a computationally unbounded A cannot obtain private information from queries.
Definitions
We begin with our notation. Let S be the set of all possible datasets. For example, if X is a finite alphabet, then we might have S = ∞ n=0 X n , i.e., the set of all possible observation sequences over X . Probability measures on parameters are usually denoted by ξ, while measures and densities on data are denoted by P θ or p θ respectively. Expectations are denoted by E ξ g(θ), where the subscript denotes the underlying distribution with respect to which we are taking expectations. In case of ambiguity, we explicitly write e.g., E x∼P θ f (x) to denote that which variables are drawn from which distributions.
Comparing datasets. Central to notions of privacy and robustness, is the concept of distance between datasets. Firstly, the effect of dataset perturbation on learning depends on the amount of noise as quantified by some distance. This is useful for characterising robustness to noise or adversarial manipulation of the data. Secondly, the amount that an attacker can learn from queries can be quantified in terms of the distance of his guesses to the true dataset. To model these situations, we equip S with a pseudo-metric 2 ρ : S ×S → R + . Using pseudo-metrics, we can straightforwadly generalise previous work on differential privacy, which usually considers the special case of Hamming distance. We note that such a generalisation has also been used by Chatzikokolakis et al. [2013] in the context of geographical information systems.
Bayesian inference. This paper focuses on the Bayesian inference setting, where the statistician B constructs a posterior distribution from a prior distribution ξ and a training dataset x. More precisely, we assume that data x ∈ S have been drawn from some distribution P θ * on S, parametrised by θ * , from a family of distributions F Θ . B defines a parameter set Θ indexing a family of distributions F Θ on (S, S S ), where S S is an appropriate σ-algebra on S:
and where we use p θ to denote the corresponding densities 3 when necessary. To perform inference in the Bayesian setting, B selects a prior measure ξ on (Θ, S Θ ) reflecting B's subjective beliefs about which θ is more likely to be true, a priori; i.e., for any measurable set B ∈ S Θ , ξ(B) represents B's prior belief that θ * ∈ B. In general, the posterior distribution after observing x ∈ S is:
where φ is the corresponding marginal density given by:
While the choice of the prior is generally arbitrary, this paper shows that its careful selection can yield good privacy guarantees.
Privacy. We first recall the concept of differential privacy [Dwork, 2006] . This states that on similar datasets, a randomised query response mechanism yields (pointwise) similar distributions. We adopt the view of mechanisms as conditional distributions under which differential privacy can be seen as a measure of smoothness. In our setting, conditional distributions conveniently correspond to posterior distributions. These can also be interpreted as the distribution of a mechanism that uses posterior sampling, to be introduced in Section 4.2.
for all y in the Hamming-1 neighbourhood of x. That is, there is at most one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x i = y i .
We believe that neighbourhood-based definitions of privacy are not satisfactory. For example, we want to generalise this to arbitrary dataset spaces S that are not necessarily product spaces. To do so, we introduce the notion of differential privacy under a pseudo-metric ρ on the space of all datasets, which allows for more subtlety.
S × S → R + if, for all B ∈ S Θ and for any x ∈ S, then:
Remark 1. If S = X n and ρ(x, y) = n i=1 I {x i = y i } is the Hamming distance, this definition is analogous to standard (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. When considering only (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy or (0, δ)-privacy, it is an equivalent notion.
Proof. For (ǫ, 0)-DP, let ρ(x, z) = ρ(z, y) = 1; i.e., they only differ in one element. Then, from standard DP, we have P (B | x) ≤ e ǫ P (B | z) and so obtain P (B | x) ≤ e 2ǫ P (B | y) = e ρ(x,y)ǫ P (B | y). By induction, this holds for any x, y pair. Similarly, for (0, δ)-DP, by induction we obtain P (B | x) ≤ P (B | x) + δρ(x, y).
Definition 1 allows for privacy against a very strong attacker A , who attempts to match the empirical distribution induced by the true dataset by querying the learned mechanism and comparing its responses to those given by distributions simulated using knowledge of the mechanism and knowledge of all but one datum-narrowing the dataset down to a Hamming-1 ball. Indeed the requirement of differential privacy is sometimes too strong since it may come at the price of utility. Definition 2 allows for a much broader encoding of the attacker's knowledge via the selected pseudo-metric. It also allows a more fine-grained notion of privacy. This is quite useful for geographical information systems, as proposed by Chatzikokolakis et al. [2013] , to which we refer the reader for a broader discussion of the use of metrics in differential privacy.
Finally, we can show that this generalisation of differential privacy also satisfies standard properties such as composition
Proof.
Our Main Assumptions
In the sequel, we show that if the distribution family F Θ or prior ξ satisfy certain assumptions, then close datasets x, y ∈ S, result in posterior distributions that are close. In that case, it is difficult for a third party to use such a posterior to distinguish the true dataset x from similar datasets.
To formalise these notions, we introduce two possible assumptions one could make on the smoothness of the family F Θ with respect to some metric d on R + . The first assumption states that the likelihood is smooth for all parameterizations of the family:
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz continuity). Let d(·, ·) be a metric on R. There exists L > 0 such that, for any θ ∈ Θ:
It may be difficult for this assumption to hold uniformly over Θ. This can be seen by a counterexample for the Bernoulli family of distributions, when the parameter is 0. Then any sequence x = 0, 0, · has probability 1, while any sequence containing a 1 has probability 0. To avoid such problems, we relax the assumption by only requiring that B's prior probability ξ is concentrated in the regions of the family for which the likelihood is smoothest:
Assumption 2 (Stochastic Lipschitz continuity; Norkin, 1986). Let d(·, ·) be a metric on R and let
be the set of parameters for which Lipschitz continuity holds with Lipschitz constant L. Then there are some constants c,
By not requiring uniform smoothness, this weaker assumption is easier to meet but still yields useful guarantees. Note that L 0 is determined by the nature of the likelihood distributions. It reflects that certain levels of smoothness are not achievable for certain likelihood functions. In fact, in Section 5, we demonstrate that this assumption is satisfied by many important example distribution families. To make our assumptions concrete, we now fix the distance function d to be the absolute log-ratio,
which is a proper metric on R + × R + . This particular choice of distance yields guarantees on differential privacy and indistinguishability. We next show that verifying our assumptions for a distribution of a single random variable lifts to a corresponding property for the product distribution on i.i.d. samples. Lemma 1. If p Θ satisfies Assumption 1 (resp. Assumption 2) with respect to pseudo-metric ρ and constant L (or c), then, for any fixed n ∈ N, p
satisfies the same assumption with respect to:
Sufficient Statistics as a Necessary Condition
The extent to which our assumptions hold for a particular family of distributions F Θ depends mainly on ρ. The choice of metric is also important for achieving differential privacy with respect to it. Let us specifically consider metrics defined in terms of a difference in statistics:
where τ : S → V is a statistic mapping from datasets to a normed vector space.
Necessity for assumptions. In that case, our assumptions imply that f must be a sufficient statistic, since if τ (x) = τ (y) then ρ(x, y) = 0 and it follows that P θ (x) = P θ (y). More generally, ρ must be such that if the distance between x, y is zero, then their probabilities should be equal. We will see some examples of such statistics for conjugate distributions in the exponential family in Section 5. That means that we cannot use a metric which simply ignores part of the data, for example.
Necessity for differential privacy. Similarly, the very definition of differential privacy (Definition 2) implies that f must be a Bayes-sufficient statistic. That means that for any x, y,
Note that this is a slightly weaker condition than a sufficient statistic, which is necessary for our assumptions to hold.
Robustness of the Posterior Distribution
We now show that the above assumptions provide guarantees on the robustness of the posterior. That is, if the distance between two datasets x, y is small, then so too is the distance between the two resulting posteriors, ξ(· | x) and ξ(· | y). We prove this result for the case where we measure the distance between the posteriors in terms of the well-known KL-divergence:
The following theorem shows that any distribution family F Θ and prior ξ satisfying one of our assumptions is robust, in the sense that the posterior does not change significantly with small changes to the dataset. It is notable that our mechanisms are simply tuned through the choice of prior.
Theorem 2. When d : R + × R + → R + is the absolute log-ratio distance (7), ξ is a prior distribution on Θ and ξ(· | x) and ξ(· | y) are the respective posterior distributions for datasets x, y ∈ S, the following results hold:
1. Under a metric ρ and L > 0 satisfying Assumption 1,
2. Under a metric ρ and c > 0 satisfying Assumption 2,
where κ is constant and C FΘ ξ is the ratio between the maximum and marginal likelihoods (see below); κ ≈ 4.91081.
Note that the second claim bounds the KL divergence in terms of B's prior belief that L is small, which is expressed via the constant c. The larger c is, the less prior mass is placed in large L and so the more robust inference becomes. Of course, choosing c to be too large may decrease efficiency.
It is important to also discuss the constant C FΘ ξ . To get a better intuition, consider the case where Θ, X are finite. Let θ * ML (x) be the maximum-likelihood estimate for x. Then we have that:
, so there is a natural dependency on the prior mass placed on maximum-likelihood estimators.
Privacy and Utility
We next examine the differential privacy of the posterior distribution. We show in Section 4.1 that this can be achieved under either of our assumptions. The result can also be interpreted as the differential privacy of a posterior sampling mechanism for responding to queries, which is described in Section 4.2, for which we prove a bound on the utility depending on the number of samples taken. Section 4.3 examines alternative notion of privacy dataset distinguishability, similarly to Wasserman and Zhou [2010] . For this, we prove a bound on privacy, that also depends on the number of samples taken. Together, these two can be used as a way to trade off utility and privacy by choosing the number of samples appropriately, in a manner described in Section 4.4.
Differential Privacy of Posterior Distributions
We consider our generalised notion of differential privacy for posterior distributions (Definition 2); and show that the type of differential privacy exhibited by the posterior depends on which assumption holds.
Theorem 3. Using the log-ratio distance (as in Theorem 2),
1. Under Assumption 1, for all x, y ∈ S, B ∈ S Θ :
i.e., the posterior ξ is (2L, 0)-differentially private under pseudo-metric ρ.
2. Under Assumption 2, for all x, y ∈ S, B ∈ S Θ :
i.e., the posterior ξ is 0,
The difference between the two bounds' form is due to he fact that while the first claim has a direct proof, the second claim arises from Theorem 2.
Finally, we show that posterior distributions are also random differentially private.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 2: [Hall et al., 2011] under pseudo-metric ρ.
This is a conceptually different definition from the original RDP, as the measure over which the randomness is defined is not the data distribution, but the prior measure ξ.
This property of the posterior distribution directly leads to the definition of a posterior sampling mechanism which will be differentially private. This is explained in the following section.
Posterior Sampling Mechanism
Given that we have a full posterior distribution which is differentially private, we can use it to define a private mechanism. We may allow the adversary to submit an arbitrary set of queries { q t } with each q t ∈ Q. Each query warrants a response r t in a set of possible responses R. The adversary is allowed to condition the queries on our previous responses.
We extend the approach of Dimitrakakis et al. [2014] to take some utility function u into account, which scores preferences of responses given a query. The first step is to simply draw a number of samples from the posterior, as in the original approach (Algorithm 2). After the algorithm calculates the posterior distribution ξ(· | x), N parameter samples are drawn from it, producing a parameter setΘ. Thus, the responses now only depend on the utility function and the sampleΘ, and we do not draw new samples after every query. This allows us to work with a fixed privacy budget.
Algorithm 1 BAPS: Bayesian Posterior Sampling
1: input prior ξ, data x ∈ S 2: Calculate posterior ξ(θ | x).
Corollary 2. Algorithm 1 is differentially private.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3, as the algorithm samples from the posterior distribution, which is differentially private.
Utility and optimal responses. We assume the collection of a set of utility functions U = { u θ : θ ∈ Θ }, such that the optimal response for a given parameter θ is the one maximising a utility function u θ : Q × R → [0, 1]. If we know the true parameter θ, then we should respond to any query q with r ∈ arg max r u θ (q, r). However, since θ is unknown, we must select a method for conveying the required information. In a Bayesian setting, there are three main approaches we could employ. The standard methodology is to maximise expected utility with respect to the posterior. This corresponds to marginalising out θ, and responding with:
The second is to use the maximum a posteriori value of θ. The final, which we employ here, is to use sampling; i.e., to reply to each query using parameters sampled from the posterior. This allows us to reply to arbitrary queries without compromising privacy, since the most information an adversary could obtain is the set of sampled parameters. By adjusting the number of samples used, we can easily trade off between privacy and utility. After this we respond to a series of queries. For the t-th received query q t , the algorithm returns the optimal response over the sampled parameter setΘ, in the manner shown in Algorithm 2. Since we allow arbitrary queries, the third party could simply ask forΘ with a suitable choice of utility function. Then if u is bounded, it is easy to show that the loss due to sampling is bounded. Observe query q t ∈ Q, perhaps depending on r t−1 , . . . and q t−1 , . . ..
4:
return r t ∈ arg max r θ∈Θ u θ (q t , r) 5: end for Lemma 2. The returned responses have a utility which is within O ln(1/δ)/N of the optimal value with probability at least 1 − δ. Now that we have shown bounds on the utility for the algorithm above, we turn to the issue of how utility and privacy can be optimally tuned. First, we try and quantify the amount of samples an adversary needs to distinguish two datasets.
Distinguishability of Datasets
In this section we wish to relate the size of the sampleΘ to the amount of information about x that can be obtained by the adversary A . More precisely, we need to relate this to how well A can distinguish x from all alternative datasets y. Within the posterior sampling query model, A has to decide whether B's posterior is ξ(· | x) or ξ(· | y). However, he can only do so within some neighbourhood ǫ of the original data. In this section, we bound A 's error in determining the posterior in terms of the number of samples used. This is analogous to the dataset-size bounds on queries in interactive models of differential privacy , as well as the point of view of privacy as hypothesis testing Oh and Viswanath [2013] , Wasserman and Zhou [2010] where an adversary wishes to distinguish the dataset from two alternatives.
For this section, we consider a utility function whose optimal answer isΘ. This is the most powerful query possible under the model shown in Algorithm 2. Then, the adversary needs only to construct the empirical distribution to approximate the posterior up to some sample error. By bounds on the KL divergence between the empirical and actual distributions we can bound his power in terms of how many samples he needs in order to distinguish between x and y.
Due to the sampling model, we first require a finite sample bound on the quality of the empirical distribution. The adversary could attempt to distinguish different posteriors by forming the empirical distribution on any sub-algebra S.
Lemma 3. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), let M be a finite partition of the sample space S, of size m ≤ log 2 1/δ, generating the σ-algebra S = σ(M ). Let x 1 , . . . , x n ∼ P be i.i.d. samples from a probability measure P on S, let P |S be the restriction of P on S and letP n |S be the empirical measure on S. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ:
We can combine this bound on the adversary's estimation error with Theorem 2's bound on the KL divergence between posteriors resulting from similar data to obtain a measure of how fine a distinction between datasets the adversary can make after a finite number of draws from the posterior:
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 1, the adversary can distinguish between data x, y with probability 1 − δ if:
Under Assumption 2, this becomes:
Consequently, either smoother likelihoods (i.e., decreasing L), or a larger concentration on smoother likelihoods (i.e., increasing c), increases the effort required by the adversary and reduces the sensitivity of the posterior. Note that, unlike the results obtained for differential privacy of the posterior sampling mechanism, these results have the same algebraic form under both assumptions.
Trading off Utility and Privacy
By construction, in our setting there are three ways with which to tune privacy. The first is the choice of family; the second is the choice of prior; and the third is how many samples N to draw. The choice of family is usually fixed due to other considerations. However, we have the choice of either tuning the prior, so that we can satisfy our assumptions with some suitable constants L or c, or by tuning the number of samples N in the posterior sampling framework.
The following lemma bounds the regret we suffer in terms of utility when the private posterior we use is ξ ′ , in the case where the posterior we would like to use (assuming no privacy constraints) was ξ.
Lemma 4. If our utility is bounded in [0, 1] , the private posterior we use is ξ ′ , while the ideal posterior is ξ, then the regret suffered is bounded by 2 ξ − ξ ′ 1 .
Finally, consider the case where B, being a true Bayesian, is convinced that ξ ⋆ is the correct prior distribution to use, but needs to use the prior ξ in order to achieve privacy. The following theorem bounds the expected KL divergence between the two resulting posteriors.
where φ * is the ξ * marginal distribution.
We can now combine Lemmas 2 and 4 with Theorem 5, to obtain the following result:
Corollary 3. If A has a preferred prior ξ ⋆ , while the private prior used by B is ξ and it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then the loss of A in terms of the ξ ⋆ -expected utility is O η + ln(1/δ)/N , with probability at least 1 − δ.
Consequently, if
A believes the correct prior should be ξ * , he can use the private posterior sample to make decisions, incurring a small loss. Finally, we already showed that A cannot distinguish between data that are closer than O (1/N ) with high probability. Hence, in this setting we can tune N to trade off utility and privacy.
Finally, we should note that the adversary could choose any arbitrary estimator ψ to guess x. Section 4.5 below describes how to apply Le Cam's method to obtain matching lower bounds in this case, by defining dataset estimators as a model for the adversary.
Lower Bounds
It is possible to apply standard minimax theory to obtain lower bounds on the rate of convergence of the adversary's estimate to the true data. In order to do so, we can for example apply the method due to LeCam [1973] , which places lower bounds on the expected distance between an estimator and the true parameter. In order to apply it in our case, we simply replace the parameter space with the dataset space.
Le Cam's method assumes the existence of a family of probability measures indexed by some parameter, with the parameter space being equipped with a pseudo-metric. In our setting, we use Le Cam's method in a slightly unorthodox, but very natural manner. Define the family of probability measures on Θ to be:
the family of posterior measures in the parameter space, for a specific prior ξ. Consequently, now S plays the role of the parameter space, while ρ is used as the metric. The original family F Θ plays no further role in this construction, other than a way to specify the posterior distributions from the prior. Now let ψ be an arbitrary estimator of the unknown data x. As in Le Cam, we extend ρ to subsets of S so that
Now we can re-state the following well-known Lemma for our specific setting.
Lemma 5 (Le Cam's method). Let ψ be an estimator of x on Ξ taking values in the metric space (S, ρ). Suppose that there are well-separated subsets S 1 , S 2 such that ρ(S 1 , S 2 ) ≥ 2δ. Suppose also that Ξ 1 , Ξ 2 are subsets of Ξ such that x ∈ S i for ξ(· | x) ∈ Ξ i . Then:
This lemma has an interesting interpretation in our case. The quantity
is the expected distance between the real data x and the guessed data ψ(θ) when θ is drawn from the posterior distribution. Consequently, it is possible to apply this method directly to obtain results for specific families of posteriors. These would of course be dependent on the family, the prior and the metric. While we shall not engage in this exercise, we point the interested read to [Yu, 1997] , which gives a two simple examples with minimax rates of O(n −4/9 ) and O(n −4/5 ).
Examples Satisfying our Assumptions
In what follows we study, for different choices of likelihood and corresponding conjugate prior, what constraints must be placed on the prior's concentration to guarantee a desired level of privacy. These case studies closely follow the pattern in differential privacy research where the main theorem for a new mechanism are sufficient conditions on (e.g., Laplace) noise levels to be introduced to a response in order to guarantee a level ǫ of ǫ-differential privacy. For exponential families, we have
, where h(x) is the base measure, η θ is the distribution's natural parameter corresponding to θ, τ (x) is the distribution's sufficient statistic, and A(η θ ) is its log-partition function. For distributions in this family, under the absolute logratio distance, the family of parameters Θ L of Assumption 2 must satisfy, for all x, y ∈ S: ln y) . If the left-hand side has an amenable form, then we can quantify the set Θ L for which this requirement holds. Particularly, for distributions where h(x) is constant and τ (x) is scalar (e.g., Bernoulli, exponential, and Laplace), this requirement simplifies to
. One can then find the supremum of the left-hand side independent from θ, yielding a simple formula for the feasible L for any θ. Here are some examples, whose detailed proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 6 (Exponential conjugate prior). For the case of an exponential distribution Exp(θ) with exponential conjugate prior θ ∼ Exp(λ), λ > 0 satisfies Assumption 2 with parameter c = λ and metric ρ(x, y) = |x − y|.
Lemma 7 (Laplace conjugate prior). The Laplace distribution Laplace(θ) and Laplace conjugate prior θ ∼ Laplace(µ, s, λ), µ ∈ R, s ≥ L, λ > 0 satisfies Assumption 2 with parameters c = λ and metric ρ(x, y) = |x − y| Lemma 8 (Beta-Binomial conjugate prior). The Binomial distribution Binom(θ, n), with Binomial prior θ ∼ Beta(α, β), α = β > 1 satisfies Assumption 2 for c = 2 −2α+1 /B(α), where B(α) denotes the beta function with parameter α = β, and metric ρ(x, y) = x − y 1 , where x, y ∈ {0, 1} n .
Lemma 9 (Normal distribution with known mean and unknown variance). The normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) with an exponential prior σ 2 ∼ Exp(λ) satisfies Assumption 2 with parameter c = λ and metric ρ(x, y) = x 2 − y 2 + 2 |x − y|.
Lemma 10 (Discrete Bayesian networks). Consider a family of discrete Bayesian networks on K variables, F Θ = { P θ : θ ∈ Θ }. More specifically, each member P θ , is a distribution on a finite space S = K k=1 S k and we write P θ (x) for the probability of any outcome x = (x 1 , . . . , x K ) in S. We also let ρ(x, y) K k=1 I {x k = y k } be the distance between x and y. If ǫ is the smallest probability assigned to any one sub-event, then Assumption 1 is satisfied with L = ln 1/ǫ.
The above examples demonstrate that our assumptions are reasonable. In fact, for several of them we recover standard choices of prior distributions.
Discussion
We have presented a unifying framework for private and secure inference in a Bayesian setting. Under simple but general assumptions, we have shown that Bayesian inference is both robust and private in a certain formal sense. In particular, our results establish that standard differential privacy, as well as various generalisations, can be achieved while using only existing constructs in Bayesian inference. Our results merely place concentration conditions on the prior. This allows us to use a general posterior sampling mechanism for responding to queries, where privacy and utility are easy to trade off by adjusting the number of samples taken.
Due to the fact that no additional machinery is required, this framework may serve as a fundamental building block for more sophisticated, private Bayesian inference. As an additional step towards this goal, we have demonstrated the application of our framework to deriving analytical expressions for well-known distribution families, and for discrete Bayesian networks. Finally, we bounded the amount of effort required of an attacker to breach privacy when observing samples from the posterior. This serves as a principled guide for how much access can be granted to querying the posterior, while still guaranteeing privacy.
We have not examined how privacy concerns relate to learning. While larger c improves privacy, it also concentrates the prior so much that learning would be inhibited. Thus, c should be chosen to optimise the trade-off between privacy and learning. However, we believe that the choice of the number of samples is easier to control.
Other future directions include investigating the links between posterior sampling and the exponential mechanism, as well as with the safe Bayesian approach [Grünwald, 2012] to inference. Consider an exponential mechanism which, given a utility function u : Θ × Q → R and a base measure µ on Θ returns θ ∈ Θ sampled from the density
As also noted by Wang et al. [2015] , this has a similar form to the posterior distribution, by setting u(θ, q) = ln p θ (x) and setting µ = ξ to the prior. In this framework, privacy is achieved by setting ǫ to a sufficiently small value. However, it is interesting to note that this is how Grünwald [2012] obtains robustness results for modified Bayesian inference. This implies that in some cases we can gain both privacy and efficiency. We note that in our case, we have proven that privacy is attainable by altering the prior, which corresponds to the base measure in the exponential mechanism. Consequently, we believe it is worthwhile examining settings where adjusting both ǫ and the prior measure may be advantageous.
A Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1 For Assumption 1, the proof follows directly from the definition of the absolute log-ratio distance; namely, Proof of Theorem 2 Let us now tackle claim 1. First, we can decompose the KL-divergence into two parts.
From Ass. 1, p θ (y) ≤ exp(Lρ(x, y))p θ (x) for all θ so:
Combining this with (22) we obtain
Claim 2 is dealt with similarly. Once more, we can break down the distance in parts. In more detail, we first write:
as before. Now, let us re-write the A term as
so that the left-hand side term is the ratio between the maximal likelihood and marginal likelihood. Using the same steps, we can bound B in the same manner. Now, let us define a data-dependent and a data-independent bound:
Replacing, we obtain:
Now, to bound the individual terms, we start from A and write it as a sum of integrals that partitions
We can thus partition Θ into disjoint sets corresponding to uniformly sized
we assume L 0 = 0 for the rest of the proof. We bound the divergence on each partition and sum over L.
where (a), (b) are from Assumption 1, equation (5) and (4) respectively, and (c) is via the geometric series. Now let us move on to term B. Since the logarithmic term does not depend on θ, this is simply bounded by | ln
φ(x) |. We now attempt to bound this as follows:
Finally, since ln x ≤ ln 1 + x ≤ x, we obtain the stated bound, but it remains to tune the constant α.
Tuning the bound. This bound holds for any size parameter α > 0 and is convex for α > 0, c > 0. Thus, there is an optimal choice for α that minimizes this bound. Differentiating w.r.t α and setting the result to 0 yields
where ω is the unique non-zero solution to e ω = 2ω + 1. The optimal bound is then
As the ω ≈ 1.25643 is the unique positive solution to e ω = 2ω + 1, and we define κ =
2ω
(1−e −ω ) 2 ≈ 4.91081.
Proof of Theorem 3
For part 1, we assumed that there is an L > 0 such that ∀x, y ∈ S, log
Further, in the proof of Theorem 2, we showed that φ(y) ≤ exp{Lρ(x, y)}φ(x) for all x, y ∈ S. From Eq. 2, we can then combine these to bound the posterior of any B ∈ S Θ as follows for all x, y ∈ S:
For part 2, note that from Theorem 2 that the KL divergence of the posteriors under assumption is bounded by κC FΘ ξ ρ(x, y)/c. Now, recall Pinsker's inequality [cf. Fedotov et al., 2003 ]:
This bound yields:
Proof of Lemma 3 We use the inequality due to Weissman et al. [2003] on the ℓ 1 norm, which states that for any multinomial distribution p with m outcomes, the ℓ 1 deviation of the empirical distributionp n satisfies:
The right hand side is bounded by e
where the second inequality follows from m ≤ log 2 1/δ.
Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that the data processing inequality states that, for any sub-algebra S:
Using this and Pinsker's inequality (35) we get:
On the other hand, due to (15) the adversary's ℓ 1 error in the posterior distribution is bounded by 3 n ln 1 δ with probability 1 − δ. Using the above inequalities, we can bound the error in terms of the distinguishability of the real dataset x from an arbitrary set y as:
Rearranging, we obtain the required result. The second case is treated similarly to obtain:
Proof of Lemma 2 Sampling N times from the posterior, gives us the following estimate of the utility functionû ξ (q, r) = 1 N θ∈Θ u θ (q, r), which with probability at least 1 − δ satisfies |û ξ (q, r) − u(q, r)| < ln(2/δ) 2N
= ǫ, ∀r, q, via Hoeffding's inequality and the boundedness of u. Consequently, we can be at most 2ǫ-away from the optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4 Let r, r ′ be the optimal responses under ξ, ξ ′ respectively. For notational convenience, let u ξ = Θ u θ dξ(θ) denote the expected utility under a belief ξ. Then our regret is
This follows from the fact that
and then using the boundedness of u. The third term is dealt with identically. For the second term, note that
Proof of Theorem 5 Let φ ⋆ (x) = Θ p θ (x) dξ ⋆ (x) be the prior marginal distribution. Then the ξ ⋆ -expected KL divergence between the two posteriors is
The first term ln
dξ(θ) is bounded by η by assumption. From the same assumption, it follows that φ(x) = Θ p θ (x) dξ(θ) ≤ Θ p θ (x)e η dξ ⋆ (θ) = e η φ * (x), and so the second term is also bounded by η.
B Proofs of Examples
Proof of Lemma 6 We first compute the absolute log-ratio distance for any x 1 and x 2 according to the exponential likelihood function:
d(p θ,n (x 1 ), p θ,n (x 2 )) = θ|x 1 − x 2 | . Thus, under Assumption 2, using ρ(x, y) = |x− y|, the set of feasible parameters for any L > 0 is Θ L = (0, L). Therefore the assumption requires the prior to adequately support this range, but because the CDF at L of the exponential prior with parameter λ > 0 is simply given by 1 − exp(−λL), every such prior satisfies the assumption with c = λ.
Proof of Lemma 7
For any x 1 and x 2 , the absolute log-ratio distance for this distribution can be bounded as
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality applied to · . Thus, if we use ρ(x, y) = x − y , the set of feasible parameters for Assumption 2 is µ ∈ R and s ≥ L. Again we can use an exponential prior with rate parameter λ > 0 for the inverse scale, − ln n for which the above supremum is simply ln n + ln Proof.
A ( Proof.
Therefore ln{2I p 1+p (α)}/(ln p − ln n) is monotonic decreasing in p. Then assumption 2 is satisfied by taking L 0 as ln n and c as 2 −2α+1 /B(α).
Proof of Lemma 9 For the normal distribution (5) requires: 2Lρ(x, y)σ 2 ≥ |2µ − x − y| |x − y|. Taking the absolute log ratio of the Gaussian densities we have 1 2σ 2 (x − µ) 2 − (y − µ) 2 ≤ max { |µ|, 1 } 2σ 2 x 2 − y 2 + 2 |x − y| .
Consequently, we can set ρ(x, y) = x 2 − y 2 +2 |x − y| and L(µ, σ) = max{ |µ|,1 } 2σ 2 . It is easy to see that the normal distribution with an exponential prior on its variance satisfies the assumptions.
Proof of Lemma 10
It is instructive to first examine the case where all variables are independent and we have a single observation. Then P θ (x) =
